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Abstract
Despite the scaling-up of EU surveillance, enforcement 
measures and patrolling operations aimed at border security, the 
flow of irregular migrants towards Europe shows little sign of 
abating. This policy brief shows, first, that border enforcement 
and barriers to mobility lead migrants to rely on clandestine 
mechanisms to reach destinations abroad, even if this involves 
significant risk. Second, policy interventions aimed at disrupting 
smuggling networks may make smuggling more lucrative and 
increase incentives for criminals to enter this market. Third, 
more stringent border policies and practices can facilitate 
involvement by irregular migrants in human smuggling. We 
conclude by showing that ending irregular crossings is an 
unlikely outcome so long as emphasis is placed on security 
vectors alone. If the intended goal of security initiatives is the 
suppression of smuggling networks, they must be accompanied 
by structural, comprehensive approaches and solutions. 
Accessible pathways for people to move across the Mediterranean 
into Europe are a necessary component of this response. 
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European political leaders as part of their attempts to 
curtail irregular migration flows have made patent 
their intention to disrupt or break the “business 
model of people smugglers.” In this policy brief we 
draw from our extensive field research on smuggling 
to ask1: what does disrupting or breaking the business 
model actually mean? What are the social, political 
and economic consequences of putting smugglers 
out of business? Does this approach actually curb or 
even put a stop to smuggling? 
The context
In 2016, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) estimated that 5,000 people lost their lives 
trying to cross the Mediterranean to enter Europe 
– a thirty-five percent increase since 2015. By April 
2017, a further 942 people had died or were reported 
missing in the Mediterranean.2 These figures do not 
include those who drowned and were never found 
or those who lost their lives while attempting to 
cross other regions. 
In an effort to manage the flow of migrants, the 
EU has launched a number of surveillance and 
enforcement measures and patrolling operations. 
Against this framework, irregular migration is 
primarily a national security issue and is, therefore, 
addressed via immigration and border control and 
enforcement mechanisms.3 Accordingly, the role 
played by countries in the immediate proximities of 
EU external border – such as Turkey and Morocco 
– is pivotal in restricting migrant access to Europe. 
This includes: tightening of their own border 
controls; destruction of smuggling vessels; setting up 
‘hotspots’ across their territory; and, strengthening 
bilateral and regional cooperation with the EU to 
tackle smuggling in their territories. The rationale 
behind this approach is to ultimately fight irregular 
migration in a way that emphasises the security 
Figure 1: Irregular migrant and refugee flows to Italy between 2011-2016 (crossing the Central Mditerranean)
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of the receiving state often at the expense of the 
migrants’. Ending irregular crossings is, however, an 
unlikely outcome as long as the emphasis is placed 
on security vectors alone.
This surveillance and security approach is not new 
(see figure 1). Back in 2004, the European border 
and coast guard agency, Frontex, was set up to 
promote cooperation among the EU’s national 
border authorities. In 2015, EU heads of government 
tripled the budget for Frontex’s joint-operations – 
Triton and Poseidon – in the Mediterranean. It was 
around this time that the articulation of a call for 
the dismantling of the alleged “business model” of 
smuggling through enforcement gained strength. 
In March 2015, Europol launched operation JOT 
(Joint Operational Team) Mare – which sought to 
fight people smuggling in the Mediterranean and 
across the EU. That same year, the  EUNAVFOR 
MED operation  – or Sophia – was set up to 
‘disrupt the business model of smugglers’ seizing 
their boats and confiscating their assets. In 2016, 
Europol launched the European Migrant Smuggling 
Centre “to proactively support EU Member States 
in dismantling criminal networks involved in 
organised migrant smuggling.”4 In January 2017, 
the  EU Commission called for  action to be taken 
rapidly to fight smuggling and “stem the flows” of 
migrants and refugees, with the EU foreign policy 
chief, Federica Mogherhini,  stating that additional 
actions were needed to “break the business model of 
smugglers.”5 
Despite the scaling-up of operations, the flow of 
irregular migrants into Europe has shown no signs 
of abating. 2016 was both the deadliest year in record 
and the one with the largest numbers of irregular 
migrants reaching Italian shores. The on-going 
arrival of migrants and the resilience of smuggling 
networks, amid the numerous attempts to crack 
down on them, serve as constant reminders of the 
ineffectiveness of the EU’s current approach. 
Smuggling won’t go away so long as there’s 
a demand
It is not surprising that current restrictive 
immigration and asylum policy measures have had 
scant deterrent effect. Enforcement and barriers 
to mobility have led migrants to continue relying 
on clandestine mechanisms to reach destinations 
abroad, even if this involves precarious methods. If 
we think of smuggling strictly in a business sense, 
smugglers depend on the availability of “customers.” 
The accounts of successfully smuggled migrants – 
those who most often do not figure in the numbers of 
rescued and dead migrants – play an important role 
in the decision-making processes of their friends 
and relatives who, bearing witness to the positive 
outcome of a journey, decide to embark on similar 
treks, often relying on the same smugglers. 
Our research on the decision-making processes of 
migrants who successfully travelled with the help 
of smugglers reveals that migrants’ perceptions on 
those behind their clandestine journeys are not 
impacted by negative media portrays of smugglers.6 
“Smugglers are neither good nor evil. You pay for 
a service and you get what you pay for,” stated 
Mohammed, a young man in his early mid-twenties 
from Syria, now an interpreter and social worker 
in Italy. Mohammed turned to smugglers when his 
family was denied a family reunification visa. He 
paid around 8000 euro to have his brother smuggled 
from Syria to Germany. It was a long and tiresome 
journey and Mohammed’s brother travelled across 
multiple countries via sea and land. Yet smuggling 
provided the only available way into Europe as legal 
paths have become increasingly inaccessible.
Even the often-celebrated crackdowns on irregular 
migration-  such as that along the Balkan Corridor 
– demonstrate that stringent border policies and 
practices are doomed to fail because they bolster 
the very phenomenon they intended to fight. While 
acknowledging its much larger humanitarian 
implications, the decision on the part of Balkan 
countries such as Macedonia to seal their borders 
in 2016 effectively reduced the flow of people by 
less than 1% of what was reported in the equivalent 
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successful at curtailing the flows along the smuggling 
routes, this  success was grounded in additional 
factors such as the availability of residence permits 
for Albanians  in Italy and a downturn in the Italian 
economy. The once overrun smuggling route had 
seen better days by the beginning of the 2000s. What 
happened next was relatively simple: people involved 
in the facilitation of smuggling simply returned to 
do what they did before the demand for smuggling 
services emerged.  What type of occupation this was 
depended very much on the people who comprise 
smuggling groups. When groups born out of the 
initiatives of fishermen and other people with sea-
knowledge dissolved, for example, most of their 
members returned to fishing and navigation. More 
experienced criminals found other ways to make 
money illicitly, such as smuggling drugs, among 
other things.10  If the experience of former smugglers 
in other regions of the world serves as an example, 
those operating along the US-Mexico border often 
opted to open small businesses or engage in non-
criminalized activity.11
Similar dynamics are evident in Turkey. Our 
fieldwork indicates that after the crackdown on 
human smuggling by Turkish authorities and the 
sealing of the borders by Macedonia in early 2016, 
some smuggling organizations dissolved. The 
captain of a fast boat – after a very short detention in 
Greece – ended up returning to what he did before 
working as a smuggler: being a naval mechanic. The 
boss of the organization, thought to have retired in 
Sweden, is still involved in the smuggling industry 
dealing counterfeit documents. Before setting up the 
human smuggling group, he had a long history of 
involvement in smuggling, having traded weapons, 
money, and other items. A relevant comparison is 
that involving the experience of a group of smugglers 
once specialized in the smuggling of children into 
the United States: the fear of being detained over 
their own lack of immigration status led them to 
shift their operation and area of expertise to the sale 
and distribution of false employment authorization 
cards, a task they perceived as involving significantly 
less risk of detection and arrest.12 
period in 2015.7 Yet, if the flow of people decreased 
substantially, human smuggling was boosted along 
the route. This situation led Frontex to admit that: 
[a] “steadily increasing number of detected facilitators 
is not surprising and can be expected to continue, 
especially after the closure of the transit corridor in 
March and the implementation of additional border-
control measures. Specifically, as migrants can no 
longer rely on the transportation services provided 
by the authorities and need to bypass additional 
prevention measures, their demand for facilitation 
services will likely increase. With the rising demand, 
the migrant smuggling will become more profitable, 
which will probably attract more people to engage in 
this type of illegal activity.”8 
Consistent with this, the controversial EU-Turkish 
deal of March 2016 may prove more short-lived than 
expected. The deal considerably increased Turkey’s 
political leverage over the EU and does not tackle 
the root causes of irregular migration. While there 
are big question marks over Turkish capacity and 
willingness to provide support for the more than 
2 million refugees living within its borders, none 
of the fundamental security, political or economic 
motivations behind the flow of people into the 
region have been addressed: ensuring the continued 
demand for smuggling services out of condition of 
precarity.
What does “disrupting business models” 
actually mean?
It is difficult to predict with any certainty what will 
happen if the business model of smugglers is broken 
or disrupted. In fact, empirical evidence indicates 
there is no single model or mechanism dictating 
the operation of smuggling markets,9 in which 
case efforts to curtail smuggling that assume the 
existence of a specific operational mechanism would 
be flawed. However, we can look to past enforcement 
experiences for lessons.  
In the 1990s, the Albanian and Italian authorities 
made joint efforts to curb the migrant smuggling 
trade. While their collaboration was indeed 
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In the fight against smuggling it is also fundamental 
to highlight that asylum seekers and labour migrants 
have been identified as central players in the 
facilitation of clandestine journeys, often on their 
own behalf or that of their families.13 Around the 
world people in transit work as smuggling recruiters, 
guides, drivers, or intermediaries. They escort other 
migrants across borders because of their own first-
hand knowledge of the routes. They recruit clients 
because they share the same ethnic networks. They 
provide the various services needed for migrants’ 
survival (food, care, accommodation, etc.) because 
of their long-term relationship with the local 
communities in the transit countries. They often do 
this in order to pay off the required fees, improve 
their livelihoods, and, most likely, to accomplish 
both goals simultaneously. To characterize their 
experiences along the lines of exploitation, slavery 
or trafficking alone – or as that of victims or heinous 
criminals -- is overly simplistic, as are narratives 
that seek to place migrants and smugglers as 
oppositional categories.  The critical aspect resides 
in understanding that a protracted condition of 
illegality is often behind the involvement of irregular 
migrants in human smuggling. What these stories 
ultimately tell us is that this very condition bolsters 
the likelihoods that irregular migrants stranded 
along the route might turn to other illicit business 
–smuggling included. 
What will happen next?
If the intended goal of security initiatives is the 
suppression of smuggling networks, they must 
be accompanied by structural, comprehensive 
approaches and solutions. As Tinti and Reitano 
aptly put it, “absent any measures that curb demand 
for smugglers, these militarised policies serve only 
to enrich and empower smugglers, allowing them 
to raise prices for their services. These swollen 
profit margins in turn attract more hardened and 
professional organised crime groups, who combine 
human smuggling with other forms of illicit trade 
and trafficking to create an even more pernicious and 
violent smuggling ecosystem in which migrants are 
vulnerable and therefore subject to greater abuse.”14  
Does this mean that smugglers should be left 
undisturbed? Certainly not. However, the 
humanitarian crisis taking place in Europe (and 
other parts of the world) calls for a comprehensive 
combination of policy measures. If EU efforts 
remain overwhelmingly focused on implementing 
and following security-based, enforcement driven 
practices aimed solely at disrupting models the will 
not suffice.
To save lives and undercut the smugglers this response 
needs to strike a new balance. Accessible pathways 
for people to move across the Mediterranean into 
Europe are a necessary component of this response. 
Opening such pathways is not politically popular. 
But keeping things as they are implies continued loss 
of life and further fuels the smuggling business. A 
truly effective answer to human smuggling requires 
that the EU and its members state reduce “demand” 
rather than trying to curb “supply.” Smugglers are 
often the only option for migrants fleeing a situation 
of immediate danger and distress. First steps toward 
a more durable solution require new channels for 
legal entry and the reinforcement of existing ones. 
This translates into: granting humanitarian visas; the 
creation of humanitarian corridors between transit 
countries and Europe; the expansion of European 
countries’ resettlement programmes; and the 
development of alternative legal routes for refugees 
– such as family reunification, university fellowships 
and scholarships, training programmes, private 
sponsorships, and effective mechanisms for labour 
mobility. 
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